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Political Education and the 
History of Political Thought 
DANIEL R. SABIA, JR. 
University of South Carolina 
Texts designed to introduce political science students to the history of political thought or to past 
political theories have been commonplace in the discipline, as have disputes about their pedagogical 
utility or justifiability, and methodological debates concerning their adequacy or legitimacy. In an 
effort to address these disputes and some of these debates, I construct three models of historio- 
graphical inquiry. Each model represents a particular approach, and each is defined in terms of three 
common features. The methodological debates are joined both indirectly and directly: indirectly by 
identifying clearly the majorfeatures and purposes of these approaches, and directly by consideration 
of such issues as the nature of a historical tradition, the legitimacy of certain interpretive strategies 
and presuppositions, and the viability of certain conceptions of past political theory. I conclude that 
each approach can make significant contributions to the education of political science students. 
Texts that examine the history of political 
thought "from ancient to modern times" or focus 
on political theories "from Plato to Marx" have 
been widely used in courses dealing with these 
topics since at least the turn of the century. 
Typically designed only to provide an introduc- 
tion to the subject matter, these studies combine 
original research with secondary scholarship in a 
variety of formats emphasizing sometimes diver- 
gent perspectives and pedagogical concerns. 
Despite this diversity, the authors of these texts all 
agree on one point: the study of Western political 
thought provides one of the foundations of a 
sound education in political science. 
The central purpose of this article is to recon- 
firm that a familiarity with the history of political 
thought can contribute to political education in 
two main ways: it can develop in students the his- 
torical knowledge, and especially the historical 
sense, necessary to an adequate understanding of 
political study and political life, and it can help to 
cultivate in students the ability to think sys- 
tematically, analytically, creatively, and critically 
about political ideas, practices, and problems. 
These essentially instrumental arguments will 
be developed by analyzing and defending precisely 
those texts that have presupposed their cogency. 
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Several times revised, the present version of this arti- 
cle owes much to the thoughtful comments and criti- 
cisms of Terence Ball, Peter Sederberg, Mulford Sibley, 
and anonymous reviewers. Substantially this version 
was presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the South- 
ern Political Science Association. 
One advantage of this somewhat indirect strategy 
is that it will allow me to contribute to some of the 
recent methodological debates about this litera- 
ture,' even though my primary aim is to defend 
the study of past political thought and theory 
against a series of longstanding criticisms. There 
have always been, and there are today, at least 
some political scientists who question the utility, 
necessity, or desirability of the study of political 
thought and its history. One objection concerns 
the relationship between political philosophy and 
political science. According to this view, political 
science is (or should be) a purely scientific disci- 
pline, and neither political philosophy nor that 
part of it concerned with past political theories 
has much to offer the student or scholar. Espe- 
cially prevalent during the rise of behavioralism, 
this argument reflects the position that political 
philosophy is a normative (and hence irrelevant) 
enterprise and that past theories are, as well, both 
ideological and outdated. The conclusion is that 
interest in the history of theory is not merely a 
waste of intellectual energy but a veritable obsta- 
cle to political education and to the development 
of modern scientific political theory.2 
'I refer to the methodological discussion and debates 
launched in the 1960s by Pocock (1962), Dunn (1968), 
and Skinner (1969). Representative discussions include 
Sanderson (1968), Leslie (1970), Pocock (1971, 1980), 
Skinner (1972, 1974), Tarlton (1973), Schochet (1974), 
Wiener (1974), Ashcraft (1975, 1980), Gunnell (1978, 
1979), and Tarcov (1982). 
'Advocates of both the new science movement in the 
1920s, and of behavioralism in the 1950s and 1960s, 
adopted these and related positions. Examples of the 
former include Charles Merriam, George Catlin, and 
William Bennett Munro; of the latter, Harold Lasswell, 
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A second common objection is that those politi- 
cal scientists specializing in political philosophy or 
theory are (or are in constant danger of becoming) 
antiquarians, that the study of past thought ought 
to be a secondary or tertiary activity rather than a 
full-time occupation or obsession. According to 
this argument, in other words, students and schol- 
ars of political philosophy do little except study, 
reinterpret, and debate past ideas and theories, 
whereas they should be concerned with the con- 
struction and criticism of current political ideas 
and theories.3 
Albeit for different reasons, these two objec- 
tions are opposed to the attention paid to past 
theories. Both would like to see those political 
scientists specializing in political philosophy 
redirect their energies to certain present-day 
endeavors: in one case, to the work needed for the 
development of empirical theories; in the other, to 
the development of normative theories. By con- 
trast, a third objection opposes, not the study of 
past thought per se, but a particular type of study 
often termed the historicist or historical kind. 
This kind of study is characterized by its focus on 
distinctively historical questions, and it is for this 
reason condemned as irrelevant to the student of 
politics. According to the argument, historicist 
studies are indefensible because they miss the 
main point, which is to utilize the study of past 
thought for present-day purposes.4 
A compelling response to these objections 
would demonstrate that exposure to the history of 
political thought is virtually indispensable to the 
education of political science students and that 
continued scholarship in this area must in conse- 
quence be encouraged and applauded. I intend to 
provide such a response by defending the texts 
mentioned above and hereafter referred to as 
Robert Dahl, and, depending on how one interprets 
him, David Easton. Lasswell's comments are typical: In 
the recent past, said he, historians of political theory 
"were so weighed down with the burden of genteel 
erudition that they had little intellectual energy left with 
which to evolve original theory. Hence empirical 
work in political science received a minimum of con- 
structive aid from scholars formally responsible for 
political theory" (Lasswell, 1954, p. 201). 
3This position has been especially popular since the 
1950s and has been articulated by, for example, J. 
Roland Pennock, Alfred Cobban, Robert Dahl, David 
Easton, and to some extent Richard Ashcraft. 
4Prototypes of historicist studies were said to be the 
works of Dunning, McIlwain, and Sabine, and were 
condemned in the terms described by David Easton 
(1953), Andrew Hacker (1954, 1961) and William 
Bluhm (1962). Similar views were expressed earlier by 
W. W. Willoughby; Leo Strauss also raised similar 
complaints. 
"histories." The defense can be restricted in this 
fashion because these histories have been specific- 
ally designed to acquaint students with past politi- 
cal thought or theory, have been traditionally jus- 
tified on precisely the sort of instrumental 
grounds I am seeking, and because they pre- 
suppose and embody the collective research of 
scholars in the field. 
An overview of these histories demonstrates 
considerable variety; different authors have ap- 
proached and presented the subject matter in dif- 
ferent ways for different reasons. This circum- 
stance requires the construction of models or ideal 
types, each representing a fairly common ap- 
proach to the writing of this sort of history. The 
models are defined in terms of three features: the 
subject matter included, called the "focus" of a 
history; the central questions posed in a history, 
called "primary objectives"; and underlying 
assumptions, called "presuppositions," which 
typically accompany given foci and objectives. 
Based on these criteria, I depict and defend three 
models. Of course, no actual history will be fully 
characterized by any one of the models, and any 
actual history will almost surely share some 
features present in more than one model. But 
because my primary interest is justificatory 
(rather than descriptive), the simplicity of the 
models presents no problem. 
The Historical Model 
The first model I define and defend is the his- 
torical model. Real-life approximations to it in- 
clude the histories of Dunning (1902), Sabine 
(1961), and Sibley (1970). The focus of this model 
is broad, including all levels of political and social 
thought from the popular to the philosophical. 
Although interested in the exposition of political 
ideas and theories, the primary objective of the 
scholar adopting this model is to explain why 
political ideas and theories appear when and 
where they do, why they change over time, and 
why (or whether) they have any influence on con- 
temporaneous and subsequent thought and 
behavior. These three objectives may be abbre- 
viated as an inquiry into the historical genesis, 
development, and influence of political thought in 
the West. 
The presuppositions that the historian brings to 
this sort of history are as follows. First he assumes 
that all forms of thought are embedded in his- 
torically specific "contexts" and, in particular, 
that political ideas and theories "are produced as 
a normal part of the social milieu in which politics 
itself has its being" (Sabine, 1961, p. v). This pre- 
supposition is made for two reasons: first, it is 
believed that the interpretation of past ideas and 
theories requires knowledge of their associated 
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contexts, because such contexts are assumed to 
condition, determine, or otherwise provide clues 
to: 1) the meanings (sense, reference, connota- 
tions) of specific terms and expressions and of the 
conventions governing the application or use of 
concepts, arguments, and methods of political 
thinkers; 2) the identity and characteristics of tacit 
assumptions and arguments made by thinkers; 
and 3) the intentions or goals motivating thinkers. 
In addition, it is supposed that knowledge of the 
contexts of ideas and theories can help explain 
their geneses. Particularly popular here have been 
the contentions that ideas and theories constitute 
responses both to perceived political problems or 
crises and to the influences of partisan and intel- 
lectual contemporaries or predecessors. 
These beliefs demonstrate a second presupposi- 
tion of the model: the idea that the composition 
of contexts is complex. In histories resembling the 
model, it has been traditionally maintained that 
the context of ideas and theories contains existen- 
tial and ideational features. Political crises and 
conflicts, major political events and trends, and 
political institutions have been among the most 
emphasized features of the existential component, 
although general socioeconomic conditions and 
trends, religious institutions and movements, and 
many other variables have been included as well. 
With respect to the ideational component, pop- 
ular beliefs and norms, and the intellectual cli- 
mate (including scientific, philosophical, and 
religious theories, fashions, and beliefs) have been 
most emphasized. 
The complexity of contexts is underscored by 
the additional assumption that they always con- 
tain a significant historical component. Specific- 
ally, it is assumed that many of the features con- 
stitutive of contexts are rooted in the pasts to 
which, in turn, thinkers are linked. Persistent or 
recurring controversies and conflicts, intellectual 
and political traditions, and inherited prejudices 
and practices are examples. It is partly because 
contexts are assumed to include a historical 
dimension that the question of influence arises. 
Given the assumption, the historian tries to ex- 
plain how political ideas and theories exert an in- 
fluence on subsequent thought or practice and 
thereby become agents of change, stabilizing ele- 
ments within successive contexts, or both. 
A final presupposition of the model is that con- 
texts change over time and space. This assumption 
guides, indeed underpins, the historian's account 
of conceptual change and development. In those 
histories that resemble the model, the identifica- 
tion and description of changing contexts are 
typically used to help explain, in narrative 
fashion, why and how "the political conscious- 
ness of men has passed from early antiquity to 
modern times" through a series of "successive 
transformations" (Dunning, 1902, p. xviii), and 
why the "reinterpretation and readaptation" of 
received beliefs and theories have been one of the 
characteristic chores of political thinkers (Sabine, 
1961, p. 145). The idea of accounting for con- 
ceptual change and development by focusing on 
changing contexts is also emphasized in mono- 
graphs that resemble the historical model-as 
when, for instance, an author seeks to tell "the 
story" or how "the modern concept of the State 
came to be formed" by "considering the his- 
torical development which prompted this con- 
ceptual change" (Skinner, 1978, pp. ix, x). 
The interrelated focus, objectives, and pre- 
suppositions of this model constitute a coherent 
historiographical approach to the writing of a his- 
tory. My primary defense of histories resembling 
the model will be that they are particularly well 
suited to developing in students the historical 
knowledge, and especially the historical sensibil- 
ity, necessary to an adequate understanding of 
both political study and political life. Although 
this is my main contention, I also argue briefly 
that these histories can encourage in students 
creative and critical thinking. These arguments 
are developed as I outline three specific themes or 
hypotheses which one would expect to emerge, 
and which in fact typically do emerge, from this 
kind of history. The first of these is the theme of 
diversity; the second a hypothesis asserting the in- 
terdependence of politics and political thought; 
the third, the emphasis placed on the historical 
character of the objects and methods of political 
study. 
An obvious and certainly common defense of 
the "historical" history concerns the benefits pro- 
vided by its emphasis on the diversity of political 
thought and life. Once the historian commits him- 
self to the suppositions that all forms of political 
thought are to some extent context dependent and 
that contexts change over time, his account of the 
history of political thought will stress diversity. 
This emphasis should awaken students to the 
plurality of political ideas and ideals, perspectives 
and theories, and of forms of political life. How- 
ever we might judge Sabine's history, for exam- 
ple, a student cannot read it and then claim that 
all persons and communities seek the same goods 
or ends; that concepts such as democracy, free- 
dom, and justice have either only one meaning or 
always have the same meaning over time; that 
there is but one way of studying politics, organiz- 
ing political and social life, or justifying political 
practices and principles. 
An exposure to the diversity of political 
thought and life can thus shake up preconceptions 
and prejudices, liberating students from the tyran- 
ny of conventional modes of thinking. It can en- 
courage creativity and critical thought by enlarg- 
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ing the sense of the possible and undermining the 
supposed certainty or "naturalness" of current 
shibboleths and reifications. In other words, a 
healthy sense of diversity can provide a counter- 
balance to intellectual smugness or ossification, a 
sensitivity to the fact that virtually all political and 
social concepts and ideals are problematic and 
contested and can be exploited for different pur- 
poses by political ideologues, theorists, and scien- 
tists. Moreover, although this emphasis can help 
students discern the provincial and modern in 
contemporary institutional arrangements, ideol- 
ogies, and theories, an exposure to the history of 
Western political thought can demonstrate to 
students that "truly novel ideas in the domains of 
morals and politics are extremely rare" (Sibley, 
1970, p. 7). 
Although a healthy sense of the diversity of 
political thought and of forms of political life is 
encouraged by these histories, even more signifi- 
cant is the illumination provided by the hypothesis 
that political thought and political life are inter- 
dependent, reflecting and constrained by one 
another. The hypothesis is commonplace in such 
histories: According to Dunning (1902, pp. 1-2), 
for example, "the only path of approach to an 
accurate apprehension of political [thought and] 
philosophy is through political history"; and 
Sabine (1961, p. v) similarly professed that his 
study was written "in light of the hypothesis that 
theories of politics are themselves a part of poli- 
tics." The elaboration and defense of this 
hypothesis produces a variety of claims which, I 
want to argue, contribute in important ways to 
political education. 
One claim associated with the hypothesis is that 
political thought is always to some extent con- 
ditioned and constrained by political and social 
life. The existential problems addressed by think- 
ers, the ideas and ideals that they articulate and 
defend or criticize, the institutions and behaviors 
assumed or condemned, the alternatives pro- 
pounded and possibilities foreseen-all these and 
more are limited, to some extent even determined, 
by the prevailing political arrangements, institu- 
tions, and conflicts within which thought takes 
shape. Similarly, developments in political 
thought seem often to follow developments in 
political and social life as, for example, relatively 
new ideas and ideals, and relatively novel perspec- 
tives on collective problems and possibilities, were 
ushered in by the emergence and spread of the 
Christian church and by the experience of modern 
industrialization. 
Historical knowledge of this sort, presented in 
some detail in the historical history, is surely of 
value to the student of politics. It has in the first 
instance obvious intrinsic value because this his- 
torical knowledge is also political knowledge and, 
as sich, ought to be a part of political education, 
but, in addition, the awareness that political 
thought so often reflects and is limited by political 
experience can alert students to the difficulty 
political scientists confront whenever they seek to 
develop transhistorical or transcultural knowledge 
of political phenomena. In this way, it teaches not 
merely humility and modesty; it underscores the 
absolute necessity of historical knowledge for 
those who would seek to generalize about politics. 
A second and related claim associated with the 
hypothesis is that political thought is often biased 
by partisanship or socioeconomic position. By 
locating thinkers within the political and social 
context of which they were a part, the historian is 
able to illustrate how political creeds and ideals 
often reflect, promote, mask, or mystify political, 
religious, or socioeconomic interests and arrange- 
ments such as prevailing distributions of power, 
wealth, and privilege. Although presented in the 
context of the history of political thought, this 
sort of knowledge is obviously not limited to its 
historical setting. The recognition that political 
thought is typically connected to political interests 
can help students understand and better assess 
contemporary political rhetoric, partisan and 
ideological conflict, and the attachment to par- 
ticular positions, creeds, and symbols by political 
groups and leaders. Further, the demonstration 
that "many bodies of ideas can plausibly be inter- 
preted, at least in part, as rationalizations of a 
given status quo" can place the student "on guard 
about one's own thinking and the degree to which 
it can transcend the pressures of class, cultural, 
and national interest" (Sibley, 1970, p. 6). 
It is sometimes alleged that the historical his- 
tories do a disservice to students by making it ap- 
pear as if political philosophy, like more popular 
and partisan forms of thought, is historically con- 
ditioned, limited, and ideological. This allegation 
is mistaken because exaggerated. In these histories 
political philosophers are indeed said to produce 
arguments and recommendations related to iden- 
tifiable interests, groups, struggles, and crises 
within specific societies, but there is at the same 
time great reluctance to conclude that political 
philosophy is reducible to ideology or partisan 
pleading. Consider, as a relevant illustration, 
Sabine's Hobbes. Examining Hobbes's work in 
the political context of the English civil wars, 
Sabine argues (what is now controversial) that one 
of Hobbes's purposes was to defend not just royal 
absolutism, but "the royalist party and . . . the 
pretensions of the Stuarts" (1961, p. 456). At the 
same time, however, Sabine demonstrates that 
Hobbes's political persuasion and alleged political 
interests hardly exhaust what he was about and 
what he produced. He does this by relating 
Hobbes's intentions and products to a much 
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wider social milieu and to an intellectual environ- 
ment neither exclusively English nor contem- 
porary. 
By examining Hobbes's thought in this much 
wider context, Sabine shows how little a partisan 
Hobbes really was and demonstrates that 
Hobbes's thought was to some extent conditioned 
and limited not by his immediate political en- 
vironment and alleged goals, but by the much 
wider range of his experience and knowledge and 
by the rich stock of ideas, beliefs, and perspectives 
available to him. Hobbes's theory is thus shown 
to transcend its immediate environment by virtue 
of its breadth, depth, and ambitions; it is com- 
parable neither to the thought of the ideologue 
nor to the typical thinker of the time. Sabine is 
drawn to this judgment precisely by examining 
Hobbes's thought contextually; for it is very hard 
to confuse Hobbes, who set out to "make his sys- 
tem broad enough to account, on scientific prin- 
ciples, for all the facts of nature, including human 
behavior in its individual and social aspects," 
with contemporaries whose purposes were exclu- 
sively partisan or whose writings were less ambi- 
tious, less abstract and systematic, and less in- 
formed by a variety of intellectual traditions 
(1961, p. 457). 
The reporting of an ideological dimension in 
what are shown to be penetrating and lasting 
theories of politics can serve to warn students not 
to confuse disciplinary demands for methodologi- 
cal sophistication and scientific objectivity with 
the absence of partisanship. Systematic, reflec- 
tive, sustained political inquiry and the develop- 
ment of genuine political understanding and in- 
sight are as much the products of political interest 
and concerns as of scientific method. Secondly, 
political philosophies are indeed shown to have 
lasting relevance not (simply) by abstracting them 
from their historical contexts but, rather, by 
demonstrating how a proper understanding of 
those contexts helps account for their relative 
scarcity, lasting value, and persistent influence.5 
Reverting to the example at hand, Hobbes can be 
shown to have produced 
a theory natural to an age which [given the rise of 
individualism] saw the wreck of so many of the 
traditional associations and institutions of 
economic and religious life and which saw above 
all the emergence of powerful states in which the 
making of law became the typical activity. These 
tendencies-the increase of legal power and the 
recognition of self-interest as the dominant 
motive in life-have been among the most per- 
vasive in modern times. That Hobbes made them 
the premises of his system and followed them 
'For relevant comments see Sabine (1953). 
through with relentless logic is the true measure 
of his philosophical insight and of his greatness 
as a political thinker. (1961, p. 475) 
The hypothesis of interdependence asserts that 
political thought arises out of, reflects, and is con- 
strained and changed by political and social life; it 
also asserts the reverse. Consequently, histories 
that resemble the historical model provide the im- 
portant-even if in some quarters controversial- 
service of reminding students not to discount the 
impact of political thought on behaviors and pro- 
cesses. "This assumes, of course, that men's 
images of the world . . . affect the way they 
behave (Sibley, 1970, p. 6), that political ideas and 
theories need to be taken into account when ex- 
plaining political conduct not because these ideas 
and theories "are true but because they are 
believed" (Sabine, 1939, p. 10). 
Exploration of this aspect of the hypothesis 
takes a variety of related forms. For example, the 
historian is likely to describe how ideas and ideol- 
ogies have in the past motivated actors by iden- 
tifying for them political problems and possible 
solutions, ends, and means. He will provide ac- 
counts of how ideas have generated or fueled con- 
flict by legitimating or condemning particular 
leaders or groups, movements, or institutions, 
and by articulating and defending interests and 
ideals. He will try to explain how popular beliefs 
or systems of thought have provided criteria for 
defining political phenomena and frameworks 
within which political reality was perceived, 
meaningfully ordered, and acted upon. And he 
will describe how ideals characteristically func- 
tioned as standards against which behaviors and 
institutions were judged and how, sometimes, 
they functioned also as goals toward which politi- 
cal decisions and actions were directed and so 
became embodied in institutions, laws, or 
policies. 
Although a familiarity with these arguments 
and accounts can be defended as contributing to 
political education on an individual basis, it is 
their collective purpose or impact which must be 
stressed. All of them help the student to under- 
stand and explore the thesis that the character, 
quality, and direction of political life is a function 
of the interplay between nature, habit, fortune, 
and autonomous social processes, and human 
thought, purpose, and struggle. Given that this 
thesis is central to the study of politics-it is either 
presupposed or examined by political scientists all 
the time-we should conclude that the historical 
history provides an important service by intro- 
ducing students to it. 
Finally, this history emphasizes the historical 
nature of the objects and methods of political in- 
quiry; that is, political life and thought and the 
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methods and theories used to study them are 
shaped by the past. I conclude my defense of this 
model by arguing that an exposure to this kind of 
historical understanding makes an especially im- 
portant contribution to political education 
because, although at one time it was widely taught 
in the discipline, it is largely neglected today.6 
Sabine (1906, p. 17) expressed this historical 
understanding particularly well when he observed 
that all things political (and indeed all things 
human) do not merely have a history; they are his- 
torical. We did not, for example, invent our 
political vocabularies ourselves; nor did we invent 
our political practices, institutions, beliefs, and 
theories; they are historical products, and under- 
standing them even in rudimentary ways requires 
knowing something about their histories, about 
how they got here, and why they take the form 
they do. Thus present-day meanings of liberalism 
and Marxism, of freedom and justice, and of 
citizenship and law, contain connotations and 
associations that are historical in origin yet pre- 
served in contemporary thought and dialogue. 
Similarly, institutions and practices embody in- 
tentions, purposes, meanings, and ideals whose 
development influences our current understand- 
ing and therefore our reactions to, participation 
in, and evaluation of those institutions and prac- 
tices. So, too, for instance, the absence or pres- 
ence of beliefs and practices in given societies can 
usually be explained only as the products of par- 
ticular historical experiences and traditions, ex- 
planations that assume precisely the kind of his- 
torical understanding emphasized in the historical 
history. 
Political theories and methods are likewise his- 
torical creatures, inventions of men and women 
familiar with certain historical experiences and 
heirs of particular intellectual traditions. For in- 
stance, consider current theories that postulate, 
after the fashion of modern economics, rational 
self-interested behavior. This postulate is popular 
partly because it appears reasonable, even 
"natural," to thinkers who live in a culture that 
has legitimized and reinforced calculating self- 
interested behavior and also because, for the same 
reason, it often facilitates explanation and predic- 
tion. Similarly, both the current interest in and 
prevailing conceptions of explanation and predic- 
tion are historical products, in this case expres- 
sions of a rationalistic culture and of an evolving 
6The importance for political science of the kind of 
historical understanding I am describing here was often 
stressed by earlier generations of political scientists, no 
doubt because of the institutional and intellectual con- 
nections between political science and history charac- 
teristic of the discipline in its formative years. See as 
examples Smith (1886) and Burgess (1897). 
conception of science dating at least to the seven- 
teenth century. 
The kind of understanding made familiar to 
readers of the historical histories also demon- 
strates why their authors use a narrative style. 
Because every present is shaped by its past, the 
history of political thought must to some extent 
be an unfolding story. It does not follow that 
these histories reify a unitary tradition of Western 
thought as some critics (e.g., Gunnell, 1979; 
Pocock, 1962) have alleged; this criticism is best 
directed elsewhere. Although these histories tell a 
story, the critics forget that its structure is com- 
plex, that it embodies discontinuities as well as 
continuities, and that it identifies the rise and fall 
of multiple traditions operating at many levels of 
experience. Consequently, the real weakness of 
these studies is that they tax the very limits of 
historical scholarship and for that reason need 
constant revision. The point here has been to 
argue that revisions ought to be welcomed, for 
they also will demonstrate that political under- 
standing must be informed by a sense of history 
and by a historical sensibility. 
The Traditional Model 
The last two models reflect historiographies 
devised by scholars who, writing during the hey- 
day of behavioralism, feared that the study of 
past political thought and theory was in danger of 
extinction, and who therefore sought to demon- 
strate that the study of past political theory was 
not an antiquarian exercise and tha(t these theories 
were not uninteresting or irrelevant by virtue of 
their old age or alleged ethical, ideological, or 
unscientific character. 
The result was the construction of historiogra- 
phies and histories that contended that, in the his- 
tory of the West, certain political theories are 
classics and that studying them is both relevant 
and significant to the education of political scien- 
tists. The primary focus of these histories is there- 
fore on the so-called classic political theories 
rather than on the many levels of political thought 
characteristic of the historical model. In addition, 
a presupposition common to these histories is that 
there are indeed identifiable classic or great 
theories deserving of close attention and scrutiny. 
These similarities notwithstanding, the histories 
to which I allude are of two relatively distinct 
sorts, the first of which is the traditional model. 
What is especially distinctive about this model is 
the claim that the classics constitute a great tradi- 
tion of Western political theory or philosophy, 
and the contention that this tradition is as impor- 
tant an object of inquiry and understanding as the 
individual theories that purportedly constitute it. 
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The foci of histories resembling this model, then, 
are the classic theories and the great tradition, and 
their objective is the critical analysis of both the 
classics and the tradition, i.e., its historical 
development. 
Examples of works adopting these foci and ob- 
jectives are the histories of Strauss (1953), Wolin 
(1960), and Nelson (1982); in each the great tradi- 
tion is understood not simply as a chronological 
sequence of works and authors who share certain 
similarities or affinities but as a relatively close- 
knit intellectual tradition whose participants were 
conscious of and deeply concerned about their 
predecessors, and each of whom sought to con- 
tribute to the development of political theory over 
time. In other words, each contributed to an 
evolving activity and, in the words of Wolin 
(1960, p. 1) and Nelson (1982, p. 2) to "a tradition 
of discourse." 
Although not part of the model, these three his- 
tories also adopt certain substantive claims about 
the tradition. These claims need to be identified 
because they serve in these works as instrumental 
justifications for the focus on the historical 
development of the tradition. The central conten- 
tion is that the tradition has in some important 
senses declined over time. The basis of this judg- 
ment is essentially twofold: first, it is asserted that 
political theory as traditionally conceived and 
practiced has been lost or denigrated; in addition, 
it is claimed that the more recent phases of the 
tradition have had a negative impact on contem- 
porary thought and practice by giving rise to cer- 
tain practices and beliefs that are judged deficient 
or harmful. The central justification for focusing 
on the classics is therefore that the student will 
come to understand (and perhaps be encouraged 
to emulate) a now lost or denigrated, but valu- 
able, way of doing systematic political thinking, 
and the central justification for examining the his- 
torical development of the tradition is that the 
student will come to understand why this sorry 
state of affairs has come to pass. 
Brief examples can help illuminate these 
remarks. In the case of Strauss (1953, pp. 35-36), 
a central position is that "political philosophers 
from Plato to Hegel" all wrestled with the prob- 
lem of "natural right"-i.e., with the proposition 
that the discovery and justification of transhis- 
torical standards of right or justice are possible. 
Premodern, especially Greek, political philoso- 
phers defended this proposition; modern theorists 
(after Aquinas) rejected it. On both philosophi- 
cal and political grounds, Strauss favored the 
Greek position and therefore characterized the 
tradition of political theory as degenerative; it cul- 
minates in the rise of ethical relativism and the 
death of political theory as traditionally practiced. 
It is the demise of natural right and traditional 
political philosophy (or the rise of relativism and 
positive social science) that Strauss identified as 
the crux of our modern predicaments, practical as 
well as intellectual. His critical analysis of the 
classics and of the tradition was thus explicitly 
designed to illuminate the origins and nature of 
these predicaments and the superior arguments of 
the pre-modern political theorists. 
Wolin presents a somewhat parallel case. In his 
view, traditional theorists sought "to identify and 
define [the] truly political" and to defend the dig- 
nity, distinctiveness, and importance of the 
political as that "order created to deal with those 
concerns [common to all]" (1960, pp. 289, 9). 
Since the seventeenth century, however, the 
"vision of political theory has been a disintegrat- 
ing one, constantly working to destroy the idea 
that society ought to be considered as a whole and 
that its general life was best expressed through 
political forms" (1960, p. 430). This disintegra- 
tion corresponds to, and is partly responsible for, 
the disintegration and denigration of political life 
in contemporary societies which Wolin refers to as 
the "decline" and "sublimation" of "the politi- 
cal." Accordingly, he too characterizes the tradi- 
tion in terms of a decline: the decline of tradi- 
tional theory and of "the political." His history is 
intended to explain the origins and characteristics 
of these modern problems and, at the same time, 
to disclose the "urgent task" of restoring the 
traditional understanding of political theory "as 
that form of knowledge which deals with what is 
general and integrative" (1960, p. 434). 
Although his history presents less of a narra- 
tive, Nelson also organizes his work around a par- 
ticular theme, in this case around "the shifting 
relationship of ethics and politics from the begin- 
ning of Western political thought to the present 
time" (1982, p. 1). The historical development 
portrayed is again one of decline, for the ancient 
and medieval theorists rightly conceived of 
politics as a moral activity, whereas modern theo- 
rists, beginning with Machiavelli, tended to sever 
ethics from politics. Ideologies, asserted to be a 
''response to the dilemmas arising out of the 
modern divorce of ethics and politics," complete 
the decline of the tradition, help to explain the 
loss of traditional theory, and underscore the 
"need" we have today "to devise political phil- 
osophies that unify ethics and politics" (1982, pp. 
1-2, 332). 
It is important to reiterate that the instrumental 
justifications underlying these histories are ex- 
plicitly tied to substantive concerns about present- 
day politics and political thought. A central goal 
of these works is to indict or to question contem- 
porary affairs, practices, or beliefs, and to iden- 
tify a presumably valuable mode or activity of 
political thinking that has been denigrated and 
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lost. By disclosing in a critical fashion the dif- 
ferent visions of the great theorists, for instance, 
Wolin believes he is introducing students to ways 
of conceiving political phenomena and of con- 
structing political theories that are genuinely 
unique and integrative while, at the same time, 
exposure to these theories throws into sharp relief 
the less worthy conceptions and modes of political 
thinking and inquiry that characterize the present 
day. 
The central presuppositions underlying the 
traditional model and these histories are therefore 
quite obvious, and they have come in for a great 
deal of methodological criticism in recent years. 
First and foremost is the presupposition that there 
exists an identifiable set of classic works, of 
master political theorists, who engaged in sub- 
stantially the same kind of activity or endeavor 
despite their separation in time and space. Also 
important are the presuppositions that these 
authors are members of a tightly knit historical 
tradition, and that this tradition has had and con- 
tinues to have a substantial impact on thought 
and practice. 
Each of these presuppositions has been criti- 
cized by a number of writers, but most promi- 
nently by Pocock (1962, 1971, 1980), Dunn 
(1968), and Skinner (1969), and by Gunnell (1978, 
1979), who deplores more fully their supposition 
that the classical theorists were members of a 
unitary tradition is a myth. These authors also 
charge that the idea that the tradition has been as 
causally efficacious as asserted is an article of 
faith for which there is little evidence. Finally, the 
presuppositions that the masters were engaged in 
a common activity, or that they commonly ad- 
dressed some particular issue or problem, is also 
rejeced by most or all of these critics. 
A defense of the model would therefore seem to 
require a defense of the presuppositions under- 
lying it. Yet many of the criticisms levelled at 
those histories that resemble the model seem to 
me quite legitimate. The basic problem is that the 
classic or great works do not in fact form a 
unitary tradition in the manner presupposed by 
the model. This is not to say that the masters were 
not engaged in a common activity, a point to 
which I return; rather the masters were not self- 
consciously participating in a great dialogue or 
tradition whose contours can be presented in 
terms of a coherent narrative and whose meaning 
and import prove causally relevant to contem- 
porary events and intellectual fashions. To discuss 
the putative tradition in this way is to endow it 
with the sorts of properties that we legitimately 
ascribe to, say, the nineteenth-century utilitarian 
tradition in Britain. And this, as Gunnell and the 
others argue, is a mistake: "What is presented as a 
historical tradition is in fact basically a retrospec- 
tive analytical construction which constitutes a 
rationalized version of the past" (Gunnell, 1979, 
p. 70). 
To label the tradition a myth is not, however, to 
undermine altogether the traditional model. As 
Gunnell makes clear, historians and other 
scholars can legitimately identify "certain simi- 
larities and differences in a range of chronologi- 
cally ordered works and speak of this as a tradi- 
tion with continuity and change" (1979, p. 85). 
Of course this presupposes that the similarities 
identified are not themselves invented or mythic, 
and here Gunnell appears to part company with 
the other critics mentioned, and especially with 
Pocock. Gunnell seems to believe that the classic 
works actually share certain important similari- 
ties, so that a critical focus on them can be justi- 
fied on pedagogical grounds. He appears in fact 
to accept the very Wolin-like position that the 
classics creatively engage "the problem of politi- 
cal order and that, in terms of their content and 
the circumstances of their production, they bear 
certain family resemblances, and possess certain 
common motifs, which make it reasonable to con- 
struct a paradigm of political theory and the 
political theorist to which specific works conform 
in varying degrees" (1979, p. 136). 
According to Pocock (1980, pp. 566-567), how- 
ever, Gunnell's position merely replicates the 
errors of the traditional model, except of course 
that in Gunnell's version the classical theorists 
"do not constitute a [historical] tradition any 
more." For Pocock, rejecting the myth of the 
tradition is not enough; one must also reject the 
myth of the masters, i.e., the supposition that 
they can, without historical distortion, be treated 
as species of the same genus. In what follows I de- 
fend Gunnell, and so the traditional model as cor- 
rected or modified, against Pocock. 
The somewhat complicated position I adopt is 
that the traditional model is in some ways defi- 
cient, but that certain central features of it deserve 
our support. With respect to deficiencies, the 
model errs in two fundamental ways: it ascribes to 
the great tradition a historical specificity and 
coherence that the tradition does not possess, and 
it ascribes to this tradition a causal impact on past 
and contemporary events and thought it never 
had. The first error can be easily rectified by fol- 
lowing Gunnell's suggestion that the tradition be 
understood, and be explicitly presented to stu- 
dents as, an analytical construct. The second error 
needs simply to be admitted and no longer 
repeated. Although we can not and should not 
ignore the influence particular masters had on 
subsequent members of the tradition, it should be 
obvious that if we want to provide a historical 
account of past and contemporaneous practices 
and beliefs, we simply cannot "concentrate on the 
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received canon of classic texts" (Skinner, 1974, p. 
280). We must instead adopt something like the 
historiography embodied in the historical model. 
At the same time, however, we need to recog- 
nize the legitimacy and pedagogical utility of the 
traditional history. In the first place, there is 
nothing wrong or untoward with using the tradi- 
tion, conceived as an analytical construct, as a 
device through which scholars present and exam- 
ine significant political or theoretical issues such 
as the problem of ethical relativism, the meaning, 
boundaries, and importance of "the political," or 
the relationship between politics and ethics. We 
can use the tradition in this way because the 
masters did, as a matter of historical fact, speak 
to these issues. They often addressed the question 
of moral standards, they certainly examined the 
nature and importance of politics, and they 
typically considered the relationship between 
politics and ethics. It is true that they did not do 
only these things, and it is true that they did not 
all think that these or any other specific issues 
were of equal importance or were even of central 
concern. But the traditional model need not deny 
these truths, and a fair reading of traditional his- 
tories indicates that they do not deny them either. 
A second justification of the traditional history 
is that treating the classics as exemplars of a valu- 
able activity and submitting them to a process of 
critical analysis serves to engage the student in 
political thinking. To repeat, the behavioral 
movement within political science led to a re- 
newed emphasis on the importance of establishing 
the direct relevance of the study of the history of 
political thought. In many cases this meant shift- 
ing attention or emphasis from the history of 
political thought to the study of political theory. 
Essentially what was claimed was that the great 
theories must be directly relevant to political edu- 
cation because they were and are, after all, recog- 
nized classics. All of the justificatory arguments 
that followed from this premise necessarily 
assumed that the so-called classics deserved their 
title. Did they? Do they? 
In a general but important sense they surely do. 
A classic is anything of recognized worth or excel- 
lence. As such, the term is honorific, and it is con- 
ventionally applied only to historical artifacts that 
have through time been influential or revered or 
both. The contention, then, was and is that in the 
history of the West certain works and authors 
Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, 
Hegel and Marx, and a few others-have been 
remarkably influential (as compared to lesser 
writers) and often revered. The historical evidence 
for this claim, including the fact that educated 
people in this century continue to read these 
authors, is so overwhelming that, in the general 
sense described, the assumption is justified. 
But if we ask why these works and authors are 
classics-if, that is to say, we seek an explanation 
for their persistence and honorific status-dis- 
putes are possible, and the assignment of in- 
dividual works and authors to the category can 
become uncertain and controversial (see, e.g., 
Sanderson, 1968). In the histories of the 1950s and 
1960s, however, there was considerable agree- 
ment. Two qualities are most often ascribed to the 
classics in order to explain their lasting value and 
attractiveness, first that the classics raise the fun- 
damental or the perennial questions and problems 
of politics, and second that they embody insight- 
ful, comprehensive theories or visions of politics. 
Complete agreement on what precisely "com- 
prehensiveness" means is absent from these his- 
tories, but there is some consensus. In general, 
comprehensiveness refers to three characteristics 
of the classics which they all meet to some extent. 
First, these theories embrace normative and prac- 
tical as well as descriptive and explanatory con- 
cerns. Second, they often include or reflect 
philosophical positions and theories, such as an 
epistemology and metaphysic, worked out by 
their authors. Third, these theories consider in 
thoughtful and typically systematic ways a wide 
variety of phenomena and issues that can enhance 
political understanding and yet are not narrowly 
political-human nature and its bearing on collec- 
tive existence, the place of ethics and education in 
political life, and the relationships between poli- 
tics and culture, religion, and economics, are 
some standard examples. 
Explaining the historical persistence and 
honorific status of the masters in this way sup- 
ports the further claim that they, at some not-too- 
abstract a level, were involved in the same activity. 
They all constructed-more or less successfully, 
depending on cases and judges-comprehensive 
theories, and they all addressed the perennial 
issues of politics; indeed, these theories can be 
legitimately read as if they constitute responses to, 
or engagements with, the fundamental or timeless 
(and not merely timely) political problems. If this 
is so, histories that identify, elucidate, and discuss 
critically these perennial issues are eminently jus- 
tifiable, eminently relevant; and this is precisely 
the position taken by the perennial-issues model, 
a model I discuss and defend below. 
The traditional model also discusses the peren- 
nial issues; in fact, histories resembling this model 
typically organize their critical analyses of the 
classic theories around one of these perennial 
issues (e.g., around the relationship between 
ethics and politics) as we have seen. But the tradi- 
tional history also emphasizes the comprehensive- 
ness of the classics. The claim is that it is especial- 
ly this feature and not just the confrontation with 
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particular perennial issues which makes the 
classics so valuable. To recover these comprehen- 
sive theories or visions, to understand how they 
were put together or fashioned whole, and to 
assess critically the claims and perspectives they 
advanced are, in the traditional model, rightfully 
seen as contributions to political education, as in- 
vitations to modes of political thinking or theoriz- 
ing in which students can participate. 
Before amplifying this additional argument for 
the traditional model, let me make clear my oppo- 
sition to Pocock's position. Pocock denies, while 
I wish to affirm, that the classics are exemplars of 
a certain broadly conceived kind of intellectual 
activity that issues in comprehensive theories of 
politics. This is not simply or largely a retrospec- 
tive analytical construction; it is rather a reason- 
ably accurate factual claim, an eminently plausi- 
ble interpretation of the historical evidence, pri- 
marily of the texts in question. It helps explain 
why the classics have persisted as objects of in- 
terest and often of respect, and explains as well 
why the emphatically contextual research under- 
taken by historians such as Pocock has not under- 
mined this position. Of course I cannot prove this 
contention here, but if we grant at least some 
validity to it, a good case can be made for an addi- 
tional justificatory argument for the traditional 
histories. Very briefly I make this case by explain- 
ing what a critical analysis of the classics-con- 
ceived as comprehensive theories of politics 
involves. 
This instrumental defense focuses on the pro- 
cess of critical analysis through which the his- 
torian or scholar seeks to "understand," and to 
"evaluate" or "assess," the classics. Exactly what 
this process substantively demonstrates will of 
course vary from historian to historian because 
different historians will entertain somewhat dif- 
ferent conceptions of what the classics are or what 
the masters did; they will emphasize or select dif- 
ferent aspects or features of the theories exam- 
ined, sometimes examine different writings of the 
same theorist, will use different standards of criti- 
cism, and will sometimes use different techniques 
or rules of interpretation. 
Despite these differences in preconceptions, 
emphases, selection, standards, and techniques, 
I want to argue that the process of critical analyl- 
sis in all cases offers students the opportunity to 
participate in political thinking. This can be brief- 
ly explained by pointing out that critical analysis 
demands of the historian analytic, synthetic, and 
critical skills. Analysis and synthesis require that 
the historian disassemble into constitutive parts 
the theories examined and that he explain how the 
parts, such as premises, definitions, preferences, 
and criticisms, are interconnected to form com- 
prehensive wholes. It is this process that helps to 
produce an understanding of the theories exam- 
ined for both historian and student. But more im- 
portant, it involves the reader, as it involves the 
historian, in political thinking. For example, in 
the effort to achieve understanding, the historian 
may be required to describe how a particular 
theorist defines and defends a particular concep- 
tion of liberty or of human nature; then to explain 
how this conception relates to a particular argu- 
ment about the desirability of or need for con- 
stitutional or absolute government; and finally to 
show how this argument fits and functions in the 
broader theory. Understanding and therefore 
political thinking are further enhanced by com- 
paring the theories examined to one another, 
comparisons invited by conceiving each theory as 
instances of a common activity. 
Creativity is involved in this process because the 
historian must illuminate, classify, and connect 
arguments and themes he feels are important and 
need attention. Perhaps the historian will invent 
abstract categories in order to highlight and 
analyze themes in theories which he feels might 
otherwise be missed or not fully appreciated. 
(Consider, for instance, Wolin's (1960) use of the 
categories "political space" and "time.") Or per- 
haps the historian will use suggestive labels in 
order to illuminate allegedly central arguments or 
themes in the works of particular theorists, as 
Strauss (1953, pp. 168, 193) does when he identi- 
fies Hobbes as "the creator of political hedon- 
ism" and Hobbes's theory as "the first philoso- 
phy of power." In these ways the historian intro- 
duces students to a new vocabulary and to dif- 
ferent ways of thinking about political ideas, 
phenomena, and problems. 
Understanding a theory also involves, and is 
enhanced by, critical reflection; this typically in- 
cludes describing the supposed implications of 
concepts, propositions, or arguments found in a 
theory, and sometimes of the entire theory, for 
practice or for thought, and assessing these im- 
plications, and the theory and its parts, in terms 
of (for example) their supposed cogency, plausi- 
bility, novelty, justifiability, desirability, validity, 
truth, or falsity. Wolin's (1960, ch. 2) critique of 
Plato's political outlook as essentially anti- 
political and Nelson's (1982, p. 43) cautious ap- 
preciation of Plato's "disturbing picture of 
democratic man," are examples. In these ways the 
historian as critic adds critical commentary as well 
as content to the theories examined, enlarging and 
enhancing the reader's comprehension of them 
and, at the same time, offering readers the oppor- 
tunity to think critically about political concepts 
and arguments, relationships and possibilities. 
This (second) defense of the traditional history 
can be summarized by saying that the critical 
analysis of the classics is itself an exercise in 
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political thinking or theorizing, an exercise con- 
trolled by the textual and other historical evidence 
available to the historian but not reducible to that 
evidence. Although it is true that this benefit is 
accorded the historian especially, the point here is 
that readers will be led to share in this activity. Ex- 
posure to the classics is in this sort of history a 
way of teaching students how to think analytical- 
ly, systematically, and critically about political 
ideas, perspectives, and problems. 
This defense is not mine; some version of it is 
explicitly made, typically in introductory com- 
ments, in most of these histories in order to 
strengthen the justificatory claim of relevance. 
Although some will fault this approach to past 
political theory on the ground that it inevitably 
leads to historical inaccuracies and distortions, I 
have tried to argue that such a charge is not only 
suspect (because the classics can bear these sorts 
of analyses), but also misses (or dismisses) the 
pedagogical utility of this approach for students 
of politics and political theory. 
The Perennial-Issues Model 
When he turns to the writing of a history, the 
perennial-issues historian focuses on the "time- 
less" political problems and issues in the classic 
texts. He thus presupposes both that there exist 
certain "enduring questions of politics," and that 
the study of the masters is particularly well suited 
to the task of ferreting out those questions- 
because, it is said, these theorists, unlike lesser 
political thinkers, "concentrated their attention 
on general principles." This is the position of 
Andrew Hacker, whose history (1961, pp. 17, ix) 
is prototypic of the perennial-issues model. Ap- 
proximations to the model include Plamenatz 
(1963) and Bluhm (1965). 
This historian's first objective, then, is to iden- 
tify for students the eternal or persistent political 
problems, questions, issues, or even approaches 
to political inquiry found in the classics. He has, 
however, a second objective. Recognizing that 
discussions of these issues by the masters is often 
submerged in historically specific concerns, the 
historian tries to demonstrate that these discus- 
sions can be made applicable to contemporary 
political study or political life. This second objec- 
tive requires another presupposition: that the his- 
torian can legitimately update or even reinterpret 
the ideas or arguments of the masters in order to 
make their language more familiar to students and 
their arguments more relevant for dealing with 
today's world. 
Because the perennial-issues historian includes 
in his history only the masters, his work may be 
confused with that of the traditional history. 
There are, however, differences between the two. 
For one thing, the perennial-issues historian is less 
interested in elucidating the nature of political 
theory conceived as a complex or comprehensive 
activity and more interested in using the classics to 
identify the "perennial problems," the timeless 
"ideas and assumptions," or "the universal 
ideas" contained or embodied in them (Bluhm, 
1965, p. 13; Hacker, 1961, p. 23; Plamenatz, 
1963, p. x). Additionally, he is not interested in 
discussing the tradition of political theory and its 
supposed development; on the contrary, he ex- 
plicitly eschews such an interest (Bluhm, especial- 
ly pp. 14-15; Hacker, ch. 1; Plamenatz, especially 
pp. vi, ix-x). Finally, he is not interested in using 
the tradition to bring into focus some fairly 
specific contemporary problem or predicament 
such as the demise of natural right or the decline 
of the political. Rather, he wants to demonstrate 
how the many perennial problems, issues, ideas, 
and approaches to political inquiry explicit or im- 
plicit in the classics may be brought up to date and 
used to elucidate better contemporary political life 
and inquiry. 
The pursuit of these objectives in the perennial- 
issues histories is of course intended to guarantee 
their relevance, to justify instrumentally the study 
of past political theory. More specifically, Hacker 
(1961, especially pp. vii-viii) argues that his ap- 
proach will illuminate for students important 
(because perennial) political problems and ideas 
and in that way help to build a bridge between the 
study of past theories and the contemporary study 
of politics. Plamenatz (1963, especially p. xi) 
argues that his history will help students "look 
carefully at the assumptions they make and the 
ideas they use" because it is just such assumptions 
and ideas that the masters articulated and exam- 
ined. In addition, Bluhm (1965, ch. 1) contends 
that his work will help students better understand 
approaches to the study of, and perspectives on, 
contemporary politics, because contemporary ap- 
proaches and perspectives resemble in significant 
ways the approaches and perspectives found in 
the classics. 
Because these instrumental defenses are quite 
straightforward and these histories (rather like the 
traditional histories) have been the object of 
numerous methodological critiques, I shall 
assume that the defense of this model requires 
primarily a defense of the two main presupposi- 
tions underlying it. The important queries here 
are: Do there exist timeless political problems? 
Can the task of bringing meaning up to date be 
defended? 
The claim that there exist timeless political 
problems presupposes that there are inherent in all 
forms of political life problems that transcend 
time. As soon as we identify such a problem, we 
commit ourselves to the view that there are certain 
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ideas or concepts that are (to some degree) time- 
less. For example, if we say that "What is 
politics?" is a perennial question, we commit our- 
selves to the view that politics is a timeless con- 
cept. Only if we accept this premise can we say, 
for instance, that when Aristotle raised this ques- 
tion, he meant by it something akin to what we 
mean by it. This does not, of course, commit us to 
the view that the term "politics" never changes its 
meaning; on the contrary, we expect thinkers 
separated by time and space to define politics 
somewhat differently. Nevertheless, it does com- 
mit us to the view that the term in some respects 
never changes its meaning. 
When radical historicists reject the contention 
that there exist timeless political problems or 
questions, they are committed to another view.7 
They suppose that a concept is individuated by its 
meaning, so that whenever a concept undergoes a 
change in meaning, it becomes a new concept (see 
Fain, 1970, ch. 2). They might argue, for instance, 
that since the Greek term for politics meant some- 
thing peculiarly Greek, it cannot be supposed that 
the term has anything in common with ours, or 
that when Aristotle raised the question, "What is 
politics?" he was doing what we do when we raise 
the question. 
Although I do not propose to resolve philo- 
sophical riddles concerning the nature of con- 
cepts, I wish to argue that the radical historicist 
view is self-defeating when applied to historical 
research. In particular, I want to suggest that the 
position of the radical historicist is, in two ways, 
radically ahistorical. First there can be, on the 
radical historicist account, no such thing as the 
history of "an idea"-such as the history of the 
idea of politics or, for that matter, a history of 
Western political theory-because the radical his- 
toricist would have us choose between two op- 
tions: either ideas are individuated by their mean- 
ing, or ideas never change their meaning. The lat- 
ter option is, of course, historically absurd; it 
would make history impossible. If, for example, 
the idea of politics never changed its meaning, 
there could be no history of this idea to tell. 
"I have in mind Collingwood, Passmorc, and Skinner. 
Collingwood rejected the view that there were timeless 
philosophical ideas in his Autobiography, as discussed 
by Passmore (1965, pp. 5-13). As Passmore points out, 
however, Collingwood also claimed that an exception to 
the radical historicity of thought might be political 
philosophy, a point on which Passmore also agrees. 
Skinner (1969), focusing specifically on political 
thought, transposes Collingwood's view on philosophy 
to political philosophy, although in the final analysis 
even Skinner is somewhat ambiguous on this point (in 
the 1969 article). A radical historicist position was also 
adopted by Lamprecht (1939). 
The former option, however, produces the 
same result: if the idea of politics is individuated 
by its meaning, whenever the meaning changes the 
idea changes and, therefore, "there is no history 
of the idea to be written" (Skinner, 1969, p. 38). 
We could, on this radical historicist account, pro- 
duce "a history of the various statements made 
with the given expression"; but this would not be 
a history of the idea, because ideas, unlike expres- 
sions or words, are individuated by their meaning. 
Writing a "history" (?) of the expression 
"politics" would, of course, be an "absurdly 
ambitious enterprise"; but, says the radical his- 
toricist, "it would at least be conceptually 
proper" (1969, p. 39). 
Second, the position of the radical historicist- 
if taken literally-makes historical interpretation 
impossible. If historically distant or alien 
languages share nothing in common with our 
own, it is hard to see, as Dilthey (1962, p. 77) once 
suggested, how interpretation could take place: 
"Interpretation," he remarked, "would be im- 
possible if expressions of life were completely 
strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing 
strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between 
these two extremes" (see also Wiener, 1961). If 
there is no similarity between Aristotle's concep- 
tion of politics and our own, how could we say 
anything about his conception; indeed, how could 
we discover that he had any conceptions at all? 
Unless the historian is prepared to assume that 
there are some similarities, some resemblances, 
between his language and that of his subjects, 
historical interpretation must be given up and his- 
torical understanding must be considered impos- 
sible. It is doubtful that the radical historicist 
means to commit himself to such a position; and 
this helps to explain why Skinner had ultimately 
to retreat from the position just described (see 
Skinner, 1974). 
There is, however, a related position that is 
both more common and reasonable, that of the 
historicist who fears that, in making the necessary 
assumption that the thought of the past shares 
something in common with the thought of the 
present, the historian will exaggerate these simi- 
larities and so fall into the trap of anachronism. 
Failure to take seriously the historicity of human 
thought and life may very well produce anach- 
ronistic interpretations and erroneous descrip- 
tions of past action or purpose. This danger is 
surely always present; it in no way follows, how- 
ever, that this is necessarily a "bad" thing. His- 
torians who turn to the past because of present- 
day concerns or interests may actually produce 
"good" history, by which I mean bring to our 
attention themes or dimensions in historical sub- 
jects or texts previously neglected or overlooked 
-and this because of their present-minded con- 
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cerns or orientation. Leslie (1970), supporting her 
case with some insightful examples, has argued 
precisely this point. 
It is also important to recognize that the alleged 
danger of anachronism is easily exaggerated, since 
exactly what constitutes an anachronistic inter- 
pretation is at least sometimes difficult to say. It 
may, for instance, be anachronistic to call Plato 
and Rousseau "totalitarians," but is it anach- 
ronistic to call attention to those features of their 
thought that remind us of totalitarianism? The 
same difficulty affects the issue of "timeless" 
problems or questions. Although the current 
problems of conservation and resource manage- 
ment are indeed contemporary, the problematic 
relationship between man and nature has been a 
persistent concern throughout human history. 
Similarly, although the question of the appropri- 
ate role of technocrats in decision making may be 
contemporary, the question concerning who 
should rule seems to be timeless; the point, of 
course, is that answers to the contemporary query 
can be approached on the basis of answers given 
to the timeless query (or, if one prefers, the con- 
temporary query is a version of the timeless one). 
It needs also to be pointed out that perennial- 
issues historians cannot usually be accused of un- 
wittingly making anachronistic interpretations, 
because they often admit to doing so. When the 
perennial-issues historian tries to bring the 
language up to date and make applicable the ideas 
and arguments of the classics, he is often fully 
aware that he is doing so and that he may, in the 
process, be distorting to some extent historical 
truth (e.g., Hacker, 1961, p. 16). Only intellectual 
historians outside the discipline' seem (or in the 
past seemed) to miss this obvious point; those 
within recognize that when a perennial-issues his- 
tory is written by a political scientist, the author is 
out to save the study of past theory from feared 
extinction (as evidenced in Hacker, 1954, and 
Bluhm, 1962). 
But one question does remain: Is the (typically 
explicit) objective of bringing meaning up to date 
legitimate? The answer seems obvious. As Hirsch 
(1972) has pointed out, all interpretive objectives 
are "ontologically equal" in the straightforward 
sense that there simply is no one interpretive goal 
or strategy sanctioned by divinity, logic, necessity, 
or any other authoritative ground. If the inter- 
pretive objective of the perennial-issues historian 
"In particular by Skinner (1969) who presupposes 
what is false: that the objective of the historical study of 
past thinkers is always the same-namely, the attempt 
to achieve historically "accurate" interpretations. He 
thus attacks Hacker on methodological grounds several 
times in the course of this essay, completely ignoring 
Hacker's objectives. 
is justifiable on pedagogical grounds it is, there- 
fore, legitimate. 
Consequently, the only remaining way to cri- 
tique the perennial-issues model is to attack not 
the objectives animating it but the justification 
underlying it. Two such objections, related yet 
distinguishable, can be identified, and both have 
been raised by Wolin, who once argued against 
this sort of history that: 
What seems to have been forgotten is that one 
reads past theories, not because they are familiar 
... but because they are strange and therefore 
provocative. If [for instance] Aristotle is read as 
the first behavioralist, what he has to say is only' 
of antiquarian interest and it would be far more 
profitable to read our contemporaries. (1969, p. 
1077) 
The first objection raised here is that bringing 
the ideas of past theorists up to date misses their 
real significance, which is their "strangeness." 
This objection cannot, on reflection, be sus- 
tained. If achieving supposedly accurate inter- 
pretations of the thought of political theorists is 
worthwhile for contemporary students of politics, 
it must be because their thought is in some sense 
relevant. Now by "relevance" Wolin means their 
ability to provoke thought-a worthy, yet none- 
theless present-minded, justification. If Aristotle 
could not provoke thought today, he would be 
found, presumably, irrelevant. But if one type of 
relevance can justify the sort of historical ap- 
proach apparently favored by Wolin, surely 
another type of relevance can justify the approach 
favored by the perennial-issues historian. If 
Aristotle can be unfamiliar yet provocative, he 
can also be made familiar because provocative. 
Wolin's second objection seems more telling. 
This objection is that the effort to make applic- 
able or directly relevant the discussions and argu- 
ments of the masters puts the perennial-issues 
historian in the odd position of saying what could 
be said more economically or at least more direct- 
ly. If, for example, the point of studying Aristotle 
is to launch into a discussion of modern behavior- 
alism, why bother with Aristotle? Or if the point 
of studying Machiavelli is to launch into a discus- 
sion of modern theories of elitism, why not dis- 
pense with Machiavelli and deal with Pareto and 
Mosca?' The answer is actually quite simple: the 
perennial-issues historian does not focus on 
Machiavelli only to talk about theories of elitism. 
Machiavelli's ideas and arguments are relevant in 
numerous other ways; for instance, one might 
also find such directly relevant or applicable ideas 
9Hacker (1961) uses Aristotle and Machiavelli in these 
ways; but see note 10. 
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as the meaning of political realism and means- 
end-analyses; the iron law of oligarchy; the ten- 
sion between ethics and politics; the significance 
of religious belief for political order; the doctrine 
of raison d'etat; various democratic ideas and 
problems; a cyclical theory of political change; 
perspectives on the limits of power; and political 
psychology.'0 For the perennial-issues historian, 
the thought of the "great" theorists opens an 
apparently unlimited storehouse of "relevant" 
ideas "which stimulate the mind and inspire the 
imagination" (Hacker, 1961, p. 19). 
Conclusion 
I have tried to defend three historiographical 
models, each representing a different approach to 
the study of past political ideas and theories, 
against the objections outlined in the first section 
of this article. Against the claim that historicist 
approaches are too past-minded to be of use or 
significance, I argue that histories using a his- 
toriography similar to that described by the his- 
torical model can on the contrary expose and sen- 
sitize students to a broad spectrum of important 
ideas. Examples include developing in students a 
sensitivity to the diversity of forms of political life 
and thought, and to the contestability of major 
political concepts and ideals; an awareness of the 
complex interrelationships between political 
thought and political practice; and an apprecia- 
tion for the historical nature of political thought, 
inquiry, and practice. 
Against the more general criticism that the 
study of past political theories is antiquarian, I 
have maintained that the process of historical 
interpretation requires creative and sustained 
forms of political analysis and reflection, that 
interpretation is not equivalent to mere descrip- 
tion or re-description. I have also pointed out that 
the critical analysis of theories enables students to 
recover a way of thinking about collective or 
political existence which is unfamiliar, compre- 
hensive, and often insightful; ,and that such 
analyses can contribute to the development of stu- 
dents' analytical, synthetic, and critical skills. 
Finally, I argue that the perennial-issues history 
provides a direct, and anything but antiquarian, 
service to the student of politics by identifying and 
elucidating themes and problems explicitly con- 
sidered, or implicitly contained, in certain old 
texts that nevertheless remain very much alive in 
contemporary political inquiry, thought, and 
practice. 
'"These are some of the "relevant" ideas besides elit- 
ism that Hacker (1961) finds in Machiavelli. 
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